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Reforming the Unbargained Contract: Avoiding
Bondholder Claims for Surprise Par Calls
By Robert S. Blanc and Randy D. Gordon*
INTRODUCTION
As interest rates fall, corporate borrowers seek to retire high interest
debt and replace it with lower interest debt. Similarly, as a once-ailing
company's financial condition and credit rating improve, it may seek to
alleviate its interest burden via a debt retirement and replacement. Inves-
tors have anticipated these events in one of two ways: either by receiving
compensation for taking the risk of early debt retirement, or by minimizing
its possibility or impact.' In practice, risk-tolerant bond investors choose
the increased compensation option by buying a callable instrument (typi-
cally a bond or debenture) carrying a higher interest rate than a non-
callable instrument, whereas risk-averse buyers purchase a purportedly
non-callable instrument or an instrument callable only at a premium.
2
This regime worked quite well for decades and led to fairly settled ex-
pectations in both issuer and bondholder camps. The advent of high-yield
(i.e., "junk") bonds, however, followed by a period of revitalized corporate
fortunes and low interest rates, has destabilized these expectations and
*Mr. Blanc (B.A., Yale; LL.B., Columbia) and Mr. Gordon (B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Kansas;J.D.,
Washburn; L.L.M., Columbia) are partners with the international firm of Gardere & Wynne,
L.L.R The authors wish to thank Virginia Winfield, a former University of Virginia Law
School student who was their summer associate in 1998 and is now their associate, for her
capable research assistance, and Richard A. Tulli and Elizabeth Howard, partners of the
firm, for their insightful and helpful comments. The views of the authors are theirs alone
and do not necessarily represent those of the firm or the firm's clients.
1. To retire debt without breaching its governing indenture, the issuer has to have antic-
ipated the possibility of falling interest rates and negotiated certain provisions of the inden-
ture to allow early retirement of the debt. At least one author has questioned whether issuers
efficiently (i.e., at an appropriate price) trade the ability to retire the debt early for higher
interest rates. See Alan Kraus, An Analysis of Call Provisions and the Corporate Refunding Decision,
I MIDLAND CORP. FIN.J. 46 (1983). Another commentary questions Kraus's approach, but
agrees that interest rate is a function of, among other things, call risk. See William A. Klein
et al., The Call Provision of Corporate Bonds: A Standard Form in Need of Change, 18 J. CORY. L.
653, 669, 671 n.81 (1993).
2. See generally STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 169
(3d ed. 1995).
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provided issuers with a powerful incentive to discover novel ways of retir-
ing non-callable or protected-call debt at par.3 This Article explores the
authority for and legality of such par calls 4 and proposes a redefinition of
the contractual relationship between the issuer and the investor in callable
bonds.
As a threshold matter, it is often argued that bondholder protection is
largely unnecessary because the great majority of bonds are bought by
institutional investors, often in private transactions.5 As we shall demon-
strate, the ability of institutions to anticipate par calls and require protec-
tive indenture provisions is far from clear; all of the major litigation over
par calls has been brought by institutions, not average investors. Second,
unless issuers are willing to forego a public market, there remains a public
interest in providing a sensible legal framework to protect the interests of
otherwise unorganized, disparate bondholders, for whom the Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939 (TIA)6 was created.7
3. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 E Supp. 1529,
1532-33 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
4. This Article does not address other disruptions in bondholder expectations, such as
mergers (especially cash mergers in the presence of convertible bonds), spin-offs, or recapi-
talizations. This Article, however, suggests a paradigm for redefining the issuer-bondholder
contract in a way that would apply to most, if not all, of the problems raised by those actions.
For discussion of those different but related situations, see generally Victor Brudney, Corporate
Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (1992);
Martin Riger, The 7ust Indenture as Bargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth, 16J. CORP. L.
211 (1991); Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over
Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1.
5. See Marcel Kahan, The Qualied Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L.
REV. 565, 583-86 (1995). But seeJohn C. Coffee,Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion:
The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHi. L. REV.
1207, 1254 & n. 136 (1991) (noting that even institutional investors can be taken advantage
of). It may also be argued that bond rating agencies, such as Moody's Risk Management
Services, Inc. (Moody's), provide information about each of the major bond covenants, such
as collateral substitution provisions, so that prospective investors can anticipate the risk of a
par call. In practice, those ratings are explanatory of call provisions rather than being true
risk analyses and, for the reasons discussed below, cannot avoid the confusion and dissension
caused by a par call.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
7. One must differentiate "institutions." A life insurance company is an institution that
buys for its own account; it probably owes a less direct duty to its policyholders and stock-
holders than, say, does a pension fund to its beneficiaries. A mutual fund may fall in between.
The extent of liability that might attach to each of these "institutions" for failure to police
call provisions in their portfolios has yet to be tested, especially in the wake of the "most
adequate plaintiff" class action test contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (Reform Act), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. III 1997). It is at least arguable that
such institutions could find themselves under pressure to bring or join litigation brought by
disaffected bondholders or face claims of breach of fiduciary duty.
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Bonds and debentures8 allow business enterprises to obtain capital from
investors in exchange for a promise to repay principal and to pay interest
over a long period of time. Stocks, on the other hand, represent a promise
to share in future profits, if any, and normally bear the risks of loss of
invested capital and absence of return on investment. Under virtually uni-
versal principles, debt instruments always enjoy a higher priority upon
liquidation of the enterprise. 9
The relationship between issuers and their bondholders is more com-
plicated than that of ordinary lenders and borrowers. A bank enters into
a contract with a borrower, often just a promissory note, and in larger
commercial loans also a loan agreement. Although the terms of the prom-
ise to repay can be quite complex, the borrower-lender relationship is
direct; there is no intermediary.' 0
THE NATURE OF THE BONDHOLDER-ISSUER
RELATIONSHIP
The bondholder-issuer relationship, however, is more complicated.
Years ago, the debt represented by a bond was typically secured by specific
assets of the issuer (e.g., the "trust estate" in the case of first mortgage
bonds).lI In order for the security interest to be protected under English
common law, the property was conveyed to a trustee pursuant to a trust
indenture. 12 Once debentures began to be issued without collateral for the
repayment obligation, indentures became devices to designate corporate
8. The difference between "bond" and "debenture" has been authoritatively addressed
as follows:
There is no inherent or clearly established distinction between "bonds" and "deben-
tures." . . . The terms "bond" and "debenture" came into use in the United States
without any definite or consistent legal connotation and to some extent are still inter-
mingled. Financial men refer to the "bond market" as including all forms of long-term
debt securities. . . . (Under preferred usage), "debenture" means a long-term debt security which
is not secured, and "bond" (except with respect to governmental or other public corpo-
ration securities) means a long-term debt security which is secured by a lien on some
or all of the assets of the borrower. Most recent issues conform to this usage.
AM. B. FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 7 n.3 (1971) (emphasis added) [herein-
after COMMENTARIES]; see Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 E2d 929, 942 n.12 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
9. Section 726(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates this principle in liquidation
cases, and § 11 29(b)(2) does so in reorganization cases under the "absolute priority rule." See
11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(6), 1129(b)(2) (1994); see also 7 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTcY1 I 129.04[a], at 1129-82[a] [i] (Lawrence R King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1999).
10. The same direct relationship exists in the case of commercial paper, whereby the
corporate borrower deals direcdy with the investor.
11. See Broad, 642 E2d at 941 & n. 12 (noting the differences between corporate bonds
and debentures).
12. For a synopsis of the development of the modern corporate indenture, see generally
Churchill Rodgers, The Corporate Trust Indenture Project, 20 Bus. LAw. 551 (1965).
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trustees to perform ministerial tasks connected with the collection and
payment of interest on the debentures.1
3
Precisely because the trustees undertook only ministerial tasks and were
not obligated to protect the interests of bondholders in the event of issuer
default, Congress undertook regulation of trust indentures as the fourth
of the Depression-era statutes regulating U.S. public capital markets. 14
Seeking to provide some protection to public bondholders in pre-default
circumstances, Congress mandated certain provisions in the indenture and
gave the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) power to pre-
vent "qualification" of an indenture that omitted any mandatory provi-
sions.15 Otherwise, Congress preserved the trustee-bondholder indenture
agreement and limited the trustee's liability to ministerial duties unless
there was a default, upon which the trustee would have to act under a
"prudent man" standard. 16 Under this system, "although the debts created
by the debentures run directly from the issuer to the holders, the contrac-
tual rights conferred by the indenture run from the issuer to the trustee
for the benefit of the holders of the debentures. '"I7
As will be discussed in more detail, this structure is anomalous. Formerly,
the trustee held the collateral; if the issuer defaulted, the collateral could
be turned over to the bondholders. Today's trustee, however, usually has
no collateral to turn over, but must fulfill the congressionally mandated
duty to act prudently; in most cases, that will involve filing a lawsuit in the
rare instance when there has been a monetary default and no consequent
bankruptcy case. But what if there has been a non-monetary default? This
can occur when the issuer invokes an alleged right under the indenture to
call the bonds at par. There is no monetary default because the issuer pays
principal and accrued interest to the date of call. The bondholders, how-
ever, lose the right to continue to receive the stated rate of interest, invar-
iably above market at that time, until the stated maturity of the bond.
Negotiation of non-monetary default provisions is largely the province
of the issuer and the underwriter (usually leading a syndicate) of the bonds.
The issuer wants the loosest possible provisions so that it can speculate
against interest rates: if rates go up, the issuer wants to keep the bonds
13. See Broad, 642 E2d at 941.
14. In chronological order, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), id. §§ 78a-7811; the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79-79z-6; and the TIA, id. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb, passed as an amendment to the 1933 Act. Later statutes in the same vein were the
Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-1 to -64, and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, id §§ 80b- 1 to -21. It may be said that the introduction of bankruptcy reorganization
under the Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 106-38, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), amending the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), was a further regulation of
capital markets in that it prevented liquidation of business enterprises in some circumstances.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 77eee (1994).
16. See id. § 77ooo.
17. Broad, 642 E2d at 941.
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outstanding so that it repays a below-market cost of money; if rates go
down, the issuer wants to call the bonds and refinance its debt, called
"refunding" in the trade, at a lower cost of money. If its financial strength
permits, the issuer may seek to issue stock and use the proceeds to retire
the bonds.
The underwriter wants to keep the issuer happy because the underwriter
also wants to lead the syndicate for the company's later debt (and possibly
equity) financings. Balanced against that interest is the underwriter's need
to form a syndicate that will buy the bonds for resale to the public. The
underwriter will "talk" the proposed bond issue with major bond pur-
chasers, such as pension funds and insurance companies. The underwriter
will know even before it approaches members of the syndicate that certain
major purchasers are content with the financial and non-financial terms
of the indenture. The head bond traders of major purchasers, who buy
tens of millions of dollars of bonds, know the market: they know the issuer,
the underwriter and money rates, and they have performed their own
economic forecasts. They rarely study the indenture, but rely on the un-
derwriters' "talk" and on the preliminary prospectus, or "red herring."
They are in the business of pricing risk.
In a "firm" underwriting, the underwriters bear the risk that the bonds
cannot be sold at the issue price, or maybe at all. If the institutional bond
traders think the terms are unattractive, they will not "indicate an interest"
in buying the bonds at the issue price; they will require a discount that
would create an up-front loss for the underwriter unless the pricing were
adjusted before the closing of the underwriting agreement. 18 But once the
bond terms have been negotiated, the due diligence performed, the pro-
spectus issued, and the bonds sold, the underwriter loses interest in the
issuer's ability to call the bonds.19 The underwriter does not assume any
further duty to the eventual purchasers of the bonds.20 The underwriter
is not the agent of the bond purchasers, who are as yet unknown.
2 1
18. In practice, lead underwriters always monitor sentiment in the underwriting syndicate
and among bond traders extremely closely in the days before the "pricing amendment" to
the public disclosure documents and the nearly simultaneous signing of the underwriting
agreement with the issuer and the separate agreement among the underwriters themselves.
19. The lead underwriter's counsel has performed due diligence under § 1 I(b)(3)(A)-(B)
of the 1933 Act and has tried to make sure that the indenture provides and the prospectus
discloses only those circumstances in which the issuer may call the bonds. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(A)-(B). By definition, an unexpected par call demonstrates that somebody missed
something in the deal. The underwriter may also be the dealer, or seller, of a large block of
bonds to its regular customers, who will be very unhappy that their interests were not pro-
tected. The underwriter and the dealer, however, will rarely have significant exposure to
liability from third parties, although the underwriter may remain a holder and, as such, be
the author of its own misfortune.
20. As a matter of fact, the underwriter will have no knowledge of the issuer's either
secret or later-developed intent to call the bonds. Nor will the underwriter be exposed to
dealer liability under § 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III
1997); see also Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 602 F Supp. 837, 840-41 (S.D.N.Y 1985).
21. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 85(l) cmts. a, e (1958).
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The trustee does not negotiate the bond's call terms and thus offers no
protection to buyers against a par call. The trustee's counsel makes sure
that the mandatory language required by the TIA is present and that the
prospectus reflects the indenture. To the extent that anyone tries to impose
a duty or risk on the trustee, it and its counsel vigorously fend them off.
Their goal is to limit the trustee's pre-default duties to the ministerial. Like
the underwriter, the trustee is not the agent of the bond purchasers.
Ironically, it is the indenture system that has protected issuers seeking
to "aggressively" redeem their non- or restricted-call debt at par. Inden-
tures may contain provisions that allow for par calls, as distinguished from
scheduled premium calls. These provisions (non-call exceptions) evolved
to protect holders from erosion of their collateral through the sale or
diminution of secured assets while the debts were outstanding. Four of the
most common 22 non-call exceptions are:
(i) Maintenance and replacement (M & R)fund requirements. M & R provisions
are designed to provide for the maintenance and replacement of an
enterprise's (usually a utility's) physical plant, which is likely to suffer
the effects of aging over the course of a long bond's maturity. Specific
fund requirements vary, but in general they require a company to
expend a portion of some benchmark (e.g., operating revenue) on
yearly maintenance. Actual expenditures tend to meet this require-
ment. To the extent that there is a shortfall, however, indentures often
allow the issuer to supply it with the proceeds of bonds redeemed at
a special redemption price (often par). Such a provision allows an
issuer to "arrange" a shortfall, often by accounting maneuvers, in
order to redeem high interest bonds.
(ii) Sinkingfunds.23 One particular type of sinking fund-viz., the "fun-
neled" sinking fund-places high yield bonds at particular risk. This
is so because the entire sinking fund obligation may be "funneled"
to a single issue. Thus, a one percent sinking fund obligation mea-
sured against total bonded indebtedness may have a tenfold impact
vis-A-vis a targeted issue. 24
(iii) Release and substitution (R & S) of property provisions. Under typical R &
S provisions, a company may redeem debt, often at par, if it sells all
22. See generally HELEN H. CLEMENT, ELECTRIC UTILITY REDEMPTION MANUAL (J.P
Morgan 1994).
23. Id. at iv-v. Although variously defined, a sinking fund has been said to be "[t]he
aggregate of sums of money (as those arising from particular taxes or sources of revenue)
set apart and invested, usually at fixed intervals, for the extinguishment of the debt of a
government or corporation, by the accumulation of interest." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
802-03 (4th ed. 1951).
24. CLEMENT, supra note 22, at iv (citing the example of Alabama Power, which-in
January 1994-made a funneled sinking fund call at par that amounted to over 7% of an
issue that appeared to have only a 1% sinking fund).
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or part of its assets. Proceeds of a qualifying asset sale are deposited
with the trustee, who, pursuant to provisions dealing with cash de-
posits, may be instructed to redeem bonds. Such a provision was
designed to protect the value of the trust estate; however, it also
encourages a company to time and structure asset sales in a manner
likely to capitalize on the opportunity to redeem high-coupon debt.
2 5
(iv) Eminent domain provisions. Par calls are also permitted when all or part
of the trust estate is taken pursuant to a government entity's power
of eminent domain. As with R & S provisions, eminent domain
clauses were developed to prevent collateral erosion. The par call
feature, however, encourages an issuer to seek government involve-
ment-or the appearance of government involvement-in asset sales
in order to invoke the right to eminent domain redemption.
26
THE NATURE OF THE NON-CALLABLE
BOND CONTRACT
Bonds are sold with two key terms: coupon rate and maturity date.
Many institutional investors (e.g., pension funds and insurance companies)
purchase non-callable bonds in order to match the cash flow from these
bonds27 to expected cash outlays. The non-callable feature of the bonds
allows that matching without the risk of redemption if interest rates fall
or corporate fortunes improve. This risk is, of course, partially quantifia-
ble,28 but all risk measurement ultimately remains a function of relative
probabilities. A non-callable bond removes interest rate volatility as an
issue of analytical concern because, in theory, such a bond will remain
outstanding even if interest rates fall and its redemption would be finan-
cially expedient for the issuer.
The market has demonstrated in recent years that many bondholders
are willing to pay to insure that their bonds will remain outstanding to
25. Id. at v (citing the recent example of Georgia Power's sale of its interest in a generating
facility that led to the redemption at par of hundreds of millions of its bonds).
26. Id. (noting a condemnation, the proceeds of which Boston Edison used to call
$10,000,000 of high-yield bonds); see also infra notes 57-60, 73-78, and accompanying text.
27. Insurance company and pension fund investors purchase bonds, not only for safety of
principal and rate of return, but also for duration, a calculation of the "effective maturity"
of the bond so as to match the interest-rate risk of holding the bond against the similar risk
of liabilities the company owes. See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 672-
76 (4th ed. 1996). Duration allows the fund manager to match the expected proceeds against
the requirements of a maturing pension or actuarially probable life insurance mortality. A
premature redemption of the bond upsets that calculation unless a comparable bond, in-
cluding a like yield to maturity, is available in the marketplace. Normally that would be
difficult to find.
28. The longer the duration, the greater the percentage price changes of a bond. Thus
reducing duration, or matching durations of assets and liabilities, can be said to partially
quantify (by hedging) the risks of redemption owing to interest rate changes. See id. at 673.
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maturity.2 9 This insurance comes in the form of an indenture provision,
generally repeated on the bonds themselves, stating that the bonds "shall
not be subject to redemption at the option of the company prior to ma-
turity." The prospectus 30 pursuant to which the bonds will be sold usually
highlights that statement in the summary (at the beginning of the pro-
spectus) and contains a longer, more detailed description of the indenture
provisions in a later section in which the security is described. Exceptions
to the general statement, such as an M & R clause, commonly will be
described there. It is the adequacy of this description upon which an
issuance-based claim (such as securities fraud) will turn. If a bond is mar-
keted as non-callable, any exceptions to that characterization must be
clearly disclosed in the prospectus.
LIABILITY CAN ARISE AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OR
AT THE TIME OF REDEMPTION OF THE BONDS
We now examine the remedies that may be available to bondholders
faced with an unauthorized par call. These remedies include both state
and federal securities law and state common law causes of action, and
various damage theories that can materially increase the bondholders'
recovery.
A redemption is proper only if: (i) the terms of the bonds permit early
redemption, and (ii) the possibility of early redemption was adequately
disclosed at the time the bonds were offered and issued. 3 1 This paradigm
suggests that liability can arise under the "agreement" with the bond-
holders governing the bonds and, if redemption was discretionary with
the issuer, the circumstances under which the issuer would exercise that
discretion. A breach of that agreement could occur at any time during the
"life" of the bond, but a failure to disclose must ordinarily occur at the
time of issuance. With those parameters in mind, we turn to the judicial
attempts to apply the paradigm.
29. As two industry commentators have noted:
Over the past several years, many private placement buyers of utility debt have been
agreeing to rates on 30-year debt that are more favorable than those available in the
public market. On the surface, it would appear to be a windfall to utilities; however, the
low rate does not come without a cost. The low-cost debt is being sold with either no
call feature in it at all, or with a "make-whole" provision, which essentially eliminates
any economic incentive for a company to refinance should interest rates fall.
Merry L. Mosbacher & William H. Broderick III, The Elimination of the Refinancing Option,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1, 1991, at 42.
30. The usual definition is that contained in § 2(a)(10) of the 1933 Act: "The term 'pro-
spectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication,
written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of
any security ...." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
31. See infra notes 65-67.
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ISSUANCE-BASED LIABILITY
The first case in recent years to attract attention to the aggressive use
of non-call exceptions was Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co.32 In that case,
the indenture permitted the issuer to redeem bonds at a special redemption
price by using cash deposited in an M & R fund. At the time the prospectus
became effective, the issuer knew, but did not disclose to prospective bond-
holders, that there had been a substantial deficiency in the annual expen-
ditures required from that fund. In effect, Florida Power & Light Co.
(Florida Power) had not been spending enough to replace depreciated or
obsolete property, thus theoretically diminishing the fixed capital assets
that backed (but did not technically secure) the bonds. In late June 1977,
approximately twenty-seven months after the bonds had been issued, Flor-
ida Power's board of directors voted to redeem approximately half of the
outstanding bonds at the special redemption price using cash specifically
deposited in the maintenance and replacement fund for that purpose.
A class action followed. The district court found that the prospectus had
adequately disclosed the circumstances under which a special redemption
could occur and held that there was no liability for having exercised those
provisions. 33 The court was unpersuaded by the vague and imprecise dis-
closure concerning the replacement fund deficiency and did not believe
that the issuer owed a duty to estimate the amount of the deficiency 3 4
On the issue of scienter, which was critical to the plaintiffs' Rule lOb-
5 claims, 35 the court found that there was no evidence that at the time of
issuance of the bonds, the issuer had intended to redeem them at a point
in the future. "The possibility of a special redemption was clear on the face
of the prospectus; the vulnerability or likelihood of such a redemption was
a matter of speculation at the time."' 36
It is important that the case was presented on appeal from a judgment
of dismissal that followed a bench trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, seeing no reason to disturb a thoughtful ruling by
the district court, appeared to have been persuaded in part by expert
testimony that the bond community was outraged and surprised by the
audacity of the redemption, but not that it had been misled by statements
of the issuer at the time of the bond purchase. 37 In other words, the
investors had taken a risk that such a redemption might occur, and in fact
it did occur.
Because the case necessarily turned on disclosure issues, there was little
focus on the inadequacy of the indenture as an instrument to protect
32. 765 F.2d 1039 (11 th Cir. 1985).
33. See id. at 1043.
34. See id. at 1044.
35. 17 CF.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997)
(codifying § 10(b) of the 1934 Act); infra note 43.
36. Lucas, 765 E2d at 1045.
37. See id. at 1046.
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bondholder interests. Modern private debt placements require debtors to
maintain certain debt to capital ratios and contain a number of financial
covenants, rather than rely solely on maintenance of a fixed asset base. 38
Ironically, then, the very provision intended to protect bondholders be-
came the instrument of defeasance of their bonds.
In the following year, Harris v Union Electric Co. 39 demonstrated the in-
terplay of non-call exceptions and their disclosure in a prospectus. Union
Electric Co. (Union Electric) publicly announced that it intended to call
$50,000,000 of its first mortgage bonds, which had been marketed under
a representation that the bonds "would possess solid call protection."
40
This protection took the form of a covenant not to redeem bonds with
funds borrowed below a certain rate of interest. 4 1 In a nutshell, although
the Union Electric indenture prohibited redemption of bonds with money
borrowed below a certain rate of interest, it allowed redemption at a pre-
mium if money were paid into the Maintenance Fund and then transferred
to the Improvement Fund. It was silent on whether money in the Main-
tenance Fund itself could be used to redeem bonds and, if so, whether a
premium needed to be paid. The company argued that money placed in
the Maintenance Fund and the Improvement Fund could be used to re-
deem bonds, no matter the source of the money, and that the proposed
redemption was thus permissible under the indenture. Courts in the state
of Missouri agreed.
42
The disappointed bondholders then sued in federal court, arguing that
even if there was no breach of the indenture, the company was still liable,
both for fraudulently redeeming the bonds and for fraudulently issuing
them. 43 In reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the bondholders, the U.S.
38. In fact, fixed asset bases are often depreciated on a tax schedule bearing little reality
to market obsolescence. Utilities for years avoided the modernization of their covenants
because of their seemingly endless ability to obtain rate increases that allowed for amorti-
zation of an increasing capital base. Recent deregulatory moves have jeopardized that ap-
proach and made increased capital bases overtly dangerous as repositories of "stranded
costs."
39. 787 E2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Harris II].
40. Id. at 365.
41. This type of covenant is generally known as a "refunding" provision. It is designed
to prevent the issuer from simply issuing bonds at a lower interest rate and using the proceeds
to pay off, or "defease," the earlier issue.
42. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W2d 239, 249-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
[hereinafter Harris I].
43. See Harris II, 787 E2d at 361. The SEC Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the call
protection described in the prospectus was a "sham. '44
The outcome of the case was perhaps foreordained because the plain-
tiffs had initially sued the issuer in state court for breach of contract. The
lower court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, con-
struing the two applicable indentures and the bond contract to prohibit
the redemption. 45 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
a close reading of the indentures revealed that Union Electric was allowed
to call the bonds.46 Having thus achieved victory in state court, Union
Electric was promptly hoist on its own petard in federal court, to which
the plaintiffs next repaired. There, the jury found that the potential use of
the indenture provisions that the Missouri state court had approved had
not been disclosed in the prospectus. 47 Although the prospectus discussed
redemption through use of cash that was first deposited in the Improve-
ment Fund and then transferred to the Maintenance Fund, it failed to
discuss redemption by using cash placed directly in the Maintenance Fund,
which in fact is what was done.
Having found that the prospectus was misleading, the court had to deal
with the absence of any specific finding by the jury on the question of
scienter. The bonds had been issued three years prior to the redemption,
but the court believed the jury verdict could be sustained on the basis that
the jury might have found that there was an ongoing course of business
and scheme or artifice, which operated as a fraud on the bondholders,
under Rule 1 Ob-5(2). 48 Accordingly, even though there was no direct proof
of the issuer's intent at the time the bonds were issued, the court sustained
the judgment based on the verdict.
49
Perhaps of critical importance was the surprising testimony by several
Union Electric officials, each of whom testified to the belief that the pro-
spectus prohibited Union Electric from refunding the bonds at a lower
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.ER. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999). It is unclear whether any of the parties or the court considered
that the plaintiff might have improperly split his cause of action by first suing in state court
for breach of contract and not there raising the fraud claim, which would appear to have
related to the same operative facts. See, e.g., Coffey v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 961 E2d
922, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1992). Seegenerally Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1181-89 (3d ed. 1995).
44. Harris II, 787 E2d at 364.
45. See Harris 1, 622 S.W2d at 241.
46. See id. at 251-52.
47. See Harris II, 787 E2d at 364.
48. See id. at 362.
49. See id. at 361-62.
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interest rate. 50 The general counsel and another person testified that the
company intended to give protection against call for ten years. It is not
discussed in the decision why the officials of the defendant chose to make
admissions that appear to contradict the interpretation of the contract
made by the state courts as well as to give credence to the plaintiffs' claims
that the prospectus was misleading and incomplete.
Unfortunately, the court's rationale for finding that the fraud was in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities was less than compelling:
'Although [Union Electric] officials had no intent to defraud when they
represented that the bonds possessed ten-year-call protection, they cer-
tainly intended to defraud the bondholders of this protection when they
announced the plan to call the bonds before the ten-year period had
run." 51 The court did not discuss whether each member of the class had
to show reliance on the misrepresentations or could rely on the "fraud on
the market" theory.
52
By way of contrast, in Florida Power & Light, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit examined the prospectus and found that the com-
pany adequately disclosed an M & R non-call exception. 53 In that case,
the plaintiffs did not so much argue that the concept of M & R was not
disclosed as that the vulnerability of their particular issue to redemption
was not disclosed.54 The court ultimately found this distinction unavail-
ing.55 If there is a lesson to be learned from a comparison of Union Electric
to Florida Power & Light, it is that a failure to reveal the possibility of an
early call is actionable under Rule lOb-5 and that a failure to reveal the
magnitude or likelihood of such a call is not.
56
50. It is unclear why interpretive testimony survived the parol evidence rule absent a
finding that the indenture was ambiguous.
51. Harris II, 787 F.2d at 369.
52. For background information on the "fraud on the market" theory, see Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1985); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F2d 462, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc). See also Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F2d 740, 742-48 (11 th Cir. 1984); cf.James
I.Jaconette, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory in State Law Securities-Fraud Suits: Mirkin v. Wasser-
man and an Examination of Market Reliance Principles in the Common Law of Deceit, 46 HASTINGS
LJ. 1967 (1995).
53. See Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 765 E2d 1039, 1046 (11 th Cir. 1985).
54. Because the indenture required redemption if the maintenance and repair fund fell
below a certain level, it turned out to be critical that there had been a substantial deficit in
that fund that was likely to increase in the future, a fact not disclosed in the prospectus. See
id. at 1044.
55. See id. Although not necessary to its holding, the court prominently noted that Florida
Power & Light was apparently under pressure from the Florida Public Service Commission
to redeem high-coupon debt. See id. at 1042; see also Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 E2d
929, 960 n.29 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (declining to rule on the question of whether the
prospectus had to describe conversion privileges in the event of a merger in greater detail
than by simple cross reference to the indenture).
56. Since those decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). That decision bars Rule lOb-5 actions brought
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In another intent case, 57 Texas-New Mexico Power Company (TNP)
redeemed nearly $30 million of non-callable debt pursuant to an eminent
domain non-call exception, even though no condemnation of property
had taken place.58 TNP argued that it had sold property "in lieu of con-
demnation" because a municipality had threatened condemnation. Its
bondholders countered that the non-call exception did not provide for
"threats" of condemnation and that the prospectus did not reveal that
TNP interpreted the eminent domain clause to comprehend asset dispo-
sitions made other than in formal condemnation proceedings. 59 Because
Lampf Pleva barred a Rule lOb-5 claim, 60 the counter-claimant class as-
serted issuance-based claims primarily under the Texas Securities Act,
61
which includes an analogue to section 12 of the 1933 Act. 62 As this Article
will discuss, 63 that statute and Rule 1 Ob-5 were interpreted to address stock
frauds in which invested capital was lost, not bond redemptions causing
interest-rate harm.
Apparently only one court has articulated a standard against which to
measure novel interpretations of standard non-call exceptions. In Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,6 4 the plaintiff argued that the
defendant "failed to reveal its ... view of the redemption language" in a
prospectus and thereby committed fraud.6 5 The case is interesting because
the plaintiff attacked the early redemption on two theories. First, the plain-
tiff averred the early redemption violated the provisions of the indenture.
Second, if the indenture were capable of being read to support the re-
demption, then that particular reading had not been disclosed to prospec-
tive investors in the prospectus. The court ruled against the first theory as
a matter of law based on the indenture language and declined to grant
summary judgment to the plaintiff on the second theory, stating that for
the plaintiff to prevail, "it would have to show that the interpretation of
the provision urged by the defendant was contrary to that prevailing in
more than three years after the violation of the statute. See id. at 364. If the violation is failure
to disclose in the prospectus the risks of redemption, an issuer need only wait to redeem for
three years after issuance to avoid liability under the 1934 Act. See id; see also infra note 68.
57. Texas-New Mexico Power Co. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4.95-CV-738-Y,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997). The case was commenced as a
declaratory judgment action. The defendant counterclaimed on behalf of a class of bond-
holders for damages under federal and state law causes of action.
58. See Fred Vogelstein, Electric Utility Bond Holders Face More Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
1995, at Cl.
59. See Texas-New Mexico Power, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748, at *3, *5. The case was
settled without a ruling by a court on any of the substantive motions, although certain findings
of fact and conclusions of law were entered by agreement. See infra notes 75, 78.
60. See supra note 56.
61. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (West Supp. 1999).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994 & Supp. III 1997).
63. See infra notes 142, 151-65, and accompanying text.
64. 570 F Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
65. Id. at 1537.
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the investment community when the Debentures were issued." 66 The court
also noted that The American Bar Foundation's Commentaries on Model De-
benture Indenture Provisions (Commentaries) offered interpretive guidelines to the
key language of the indenture and tended to support the defendant. 67 The
court did not address whether expert testimony from traders of debt se-
curities would be admissible to establish an interpretation at variance with
that in the Commentaries.
Although issuance-based fraud plainly falls within section 10(b) of the
1934 Act (and Rule 1 Ob-5 thereunder), the length to maturity of many
bonds may render section 10(b) an ineffective weapon. This result follows
the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lampf Pleva, which mandates that a
claim must be made with one year of discovery of fraud and in any event
within three years of the violation of the statute.68 Whatever sense Lampf
Pleva makes in the context of stocks, it makes no sense in an issuance-
based redemption case. In a garden-variety stock fraud case, the issuer
misstates earnings, salts a gold mine, or otherwise commits an act that, in
theory, should be discoverable in three years. But in a bond case like Texas-
New Mexico Power or Union Electric, the misrepresentation cannot be discov-
ered (even in theory) until the announcement of a redemption, which
could be many years after issuance.69 Absent a legislative solution, section
10(b) issuance-based claims falling without the Lampf Pleva, limitations pe-
riod must be brought under more favorable state securities laws70 or com-
mon law theories of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
66. Id. Archer Daniels Midland thus suggests that a bondholder can state and prove a secu-
rities fraud claim if it can demonstrate that a condemnation clause did not include, as a
matter of indenture construction, a "sale in lieu of condemnation" at the time the prospectus
and the bonds were issued. See id. at 1536. Adequate pleading would require specific alle-
gations of scienter (at least under Rule 1 Ob-5), which might be supplied by proof of motive.
See Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 E3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff
bondholder would presumably need to develop expert testimony on this issue, a task made
lighter because the widely followed Mortgage Bond Indenture Form suggests that "sale in
lieu" language is not comprehended by standard eminent domain language, but is a sepa-
rately negotiable provision. See AM. B. FOUND., MORTGAGE BOND INDENTURE FORM
§§ 6.02, 6.03 n. 14 (1981).
67. See Archer Daniels Midland, 570 E Supp. at 1535; see generally COMMENTARIES, supra
note 8.
68. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
The Court held that an implied private action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-
5 thereunder "must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts consti-
tuting the violation and within three years after such violation." See id. See generally Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule I Ob-5 and Its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits
Defy the Supreme Court, 51 Bus. LAw. 309 (1996).
69. See, e.g., Harris II, 787 E2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1986) (using the discovery rule to find
that bondholders' claims were not barred by a state statute of limitations even though the
bonds called for redemption over three years after issuance).
70. Class actions, however, may have to be brought in federal court under § 16 of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3228
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Although a comprehensive discussion of state securities laws is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that some states provide ana-
logues to section 12 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
whereas others provide only one of those choices. In Texas-New Mexico
Power, the issuance-based section 10(b) claim was blocked by expiration of
the statute of limitations under Lampf Pleva, and the state statute provided
only limited relief under an analogue to the 1933 Act.7' The statutory
measure of damages was aimed at rescission and restitution, was clearly
drafted with stock losses in mind, and did not fit a bond interest-loss case.
Most federal cases awarding damages in bond cases are based on 1934
Act section 10(b), largely because of the uncertain measure of damages
under a rescissional standard. 72 In states with only rescissional remedies
provided by statute, it will be difficult for plaintiffs in bond cases, particu-
larly where interest or market loss rather than loss of principal is at issue,
to explain to the court why the statute must be construed to do justice.
REDEMPTION-BASED LIABILITY
Redemption-based liability may be premised on a number of theories:
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, securities
fraud, violation of the TIA, and common law fraud or misrepresentation.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Early redemption may be a breach of contract under either the non-
call provision itself 73 or a non-call exception. For instance, in Texas-New
Mexico Power, TNP made no claim that a governmental entity actually
71. See Texas-New Mexico Power Co. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4.95-CV-738-Y,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748, at *2, *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997); see also Lampf Pleva, 501
U.S. at 364.
72. One commentary states:
[L] ike the plaintiff at common law in the case of a contract allegedly induced by fraud-
and unlike the section 12(2) plaintiff, who is restricted to rescission or a rescissionary
measure of damages-the seller who proves a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 has the choice
of undoing the bargain (when events since the transaction have not made rescission
impossible) or holding the defendant to the bargain by requiring him or her to pay
damages.
Loss & SEIGMAN, supra note 43, at 1061 (citations omitted).
73. A separate breach can arise from the non-call provision. For instance, on the face of
the Series T bonds, TNP contractually promised that it would not redeem them at its "op-
tion." At the time of the asset sale discussed above, TNP had outstanding at least $80 million
of other bonds, all of which were fully callable (i.e., for any reason or no reason). Thus, the
bondholders argued that even if the non-call exception had permitted redemption of the
Series T Bonds, TNP obligated itself in the Supplemental Indenture not to redeem them
when bonds of other series could be redeemed.
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condemned 74 or ordered the sale of TNP property.75 Rather, TNP argued
that it sold assets "in lieu of condemnation." A sale in lieu of condem-
nation was not an enumerated ground under the non-call exception, al-
though it could have been had the parties so chosen when the Indenture
was negotiated. 76 Indeed, "sale in lieu of condemnation" 77 language is a
standard "negotiable" clause to be considered in drafting the "eminent
domain" provisions of an indenture. Thus, the court concluded that the
"[s]ale although under threat of condemnation, was not a transaction or
event which authorized redemption of any part of the Series T Bonds
within the meaning or contemplation of [the indenture]. ' 78 The harder
case, however, is the contract claim in Florida Power & Light.79 In that case,
the expectations of the bondholders were dashed by the issuer's redemp-
tion of the bonds despite seemingly protective non-call provisions; the
bondholders' contract claims, however, were defeated. 80 What if effective
relief cannot be granted under issuance-based theories because of Lampf
Pleva and inadequate state securities law?
The problem may be the myths of the indenture contract.8 ' The first
myth is that it is negotiated to protect bondholders. Because it is negotiated
74. Condemnation, i.e., the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is controlled by a
rigorous statutory formula in Texas. That is, statutory condemnation proceedings must be
preceded by a bona fide attempt to reach agreement with a property owner concerning the
amount of compensation to be awarded for a taking. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012
(West 1984). More importantly, the findings of fact reveal that no condemnation actually
took place. See Texas-New Mexico Power, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748, at *4.
75. See id. at *4-*5 ("None of the Panhandle Cities had commenced, prior to September
15, 1995 [the notice of redemption date], any eminent domain or condemnation proceedings
against any of the Panhandle Properties.").
76. The non-call exception at issue was triggered only if: (i) any part of the Trust Estate
was taken by power of eminent domain; (ii) a municipal or governmental body exercised a
right to purchase any part of the Trust Estate; (iii) a municipal or governmental body exer-
cised a right to designate a purchaser of any part of the Trust Estate; or (iv) a municipal or
governmental body exercised a right to order the sale of any part of the Trust Estate. See id.
at *3.
77. A sale in lieu of condemnation may be distinguished from condemnation by the
voluntary nature of the transaction. Typically, the governmental entity approaches the prop-
erty owner and offers to buy the property, stating that failure to negotiate a purchase contract
will cause the governmental entity to commence condemnation proceedings. In Texas the
two concepts have been recognized in the statute, which mandates an effort to negotiate a
purchase as a prerequisite to the governmental entity's resort to the courts in a condemnation
proceeding. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012. See generally Clarissa Kay Bauer, Eminent
Domain Basics for General Practitioners, 59 TEX. Bj. 742 (1996).
78. Texas-New Mexico Power, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748, at *6. The court went on to
state: "In following its interpretation or [sic] the Supplemental Indenture and the Original
Indenture, TNP unintentionally breached the terms of the Series T Bond, the Supplemental
Indenture and the Original Indenture by calling $29.2 million of the Series T Bonds for
redemption on October 15, 1995." Id.
79. See Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 765 E2d 1039 (11 th Cir. 1985).
80. See id. at 1044.
81. See generally Riger, supra note 4. A good example of the poor fit between investor
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between the issuer and the underwriter without a clear intent to benefit
the future bondholders, it cannot usefully be analyzed as a third-party
beneficiary contract. 82 In fact, the bondholders have no effective repre-
sentation at the time the contract is negotiated, and thus do not obtain
the aggressive prohibitions against issuer redemptions that risk-averse
bondholders might require.
83
The second myth is that the indenture controls the investment decision.
As discussed earlier, the TIA-mandated indenture is largely a boilerplate
document that is conformed to the terms of the deal. 84 In practice, it may
be reviewed briefly by bond traders at the major investment houses, but
more likely will be summarized by one or more rating services, such as
Moody's, Bloomberg L.P., or Standard & Poor's. The bond traders will
generally rely on those summaries to determine whether the bonds carry
an acceptable level of redemption risk. Although this process may be
thought adequate for the very large institutional investors, who can be
presumed to protect their interests as they would in a private placement,
85
it renders nugatory the entire regulatory scheme of the 1933 Act if it were
thought adequate for individual investors. The indenture cannot be upheld
as an integrated contract because the bondholders do not even see it, but
instead rely on oral descriptions of the investment and, in law if not in
fact, the prospectus.
The indenture often begins with a clear non-call provision, which is
then weakened by the issuer's draftsmanship to include various non-call
exceptions. Neither the indenture trustee nor the underwriter seriously
reliance and contract principles is Prescott, Ball & Turben v. LTV Corp., 531 E Supp. 213
(S.D.N.Y 1981), wherein the court interpreted a notice provision to provide a definition of
"capital reorganization," without which the holders of convertible subordinated debentures
had no rights to receive stock of the principal subsidiary, which was being spun off by the
otherwise unprofitable parent. See id. at 219. The court did not discuss the obvious damage
to the credit rating of the debentures.
82. For an ipse dixit analysis to the contrary, see Broad v. Rockwell International Corp., 642 E2d
929, 941 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
83. In private bond placements, the investors usually require extensive financial covenants,
including debt-equity ratio, current ratio, and earnings tests, to measure the financial health
of the borrower. They do not rely on asset-based standards such as an M & R clause. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 E Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
84. "The prospective buyer can take it or leave it; should the buyer take it, the deficiencies
of the indenture go with it. The terms of the indenture may be highly specified, but the
purchaser did not negotiate them, nor could he have. Regardless of the technical adequacy
of prospectus disclosure, prospectus dissemination is limited and of short duration; the sec-
ondary market benefits accrue only on a trickle down basis. What might have trickled down
beyond the basic business terms would be negligible." Riger, supra note 4, at 219 (footnotes
omitted).
85. But see Metropolitan Life, 716 F Supp. at 13-14 (noting that the large institutional investor
failed to protect its interests in the public offering, although it had done so in a similar private
placement). Needless to say, individual investors could not protect themselves in either
situation.
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impedes that effort. The underwriter's focus is on interest rate and ma-
turity, with only a broad interest in the language of the call provisions.
86
The third myth is that the parties could anticipate each of the variables
that might cause a non-call exception to apply. The more detailed the
draftsmanship, the more opportunities for the issuer to later find an effec-
tive means to frustrate bondholder expectations, assuming that it did not
plan the loophole from the beginning. It is poor policy to limit bondholder
remedies to those contained in a "contract" they rarely see, much less sign,
but that purports to have been carefully drafted to meet every possible
contingency that could affect their interests. That myth promotes an ill-
considered game of legal "gotcha" that can be constrained only by the
bondholders' energetic search for extra-contractual remedies, such as the
securities laws, or by business considerations such as the issuer's desire to
sell bonds in the future.
8 7
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH
In addition to an ordinary breach of contract claim, a plaintiff may be
able to demonstrate that an issuer breached an indenture by exercising a
non-call exception in bad faith (a claim sounding in contract). Such a good
faith claim is quite narrow: it does not depend on a generalized or inde-
pendent duty of good faith and fair dealing, nor does it give rise to tort
liability. Rather, it is premised on the common law notion that the exercise
of a particular contractual provision must be made in good faith, which-
at a minimum-requires honesty in fact and commercial reasonableness. 88
86. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
87. See RICHARD S. WILSON AND FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE NEW CORPORATE BOND
MARKET 188 (Probus 1990) (stating that Archer Daniels' next bond issues "were not well
received"); Coffee & Klein, supra note 5, at 1254 n. 136 (citing WILSON & FABOZZI, supra).
88. This common law duty has been codified in the Uniform Commerical Code (U.C.C.)
See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (West 1984). Thus, the standard under either
the common law, as stated in § 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, or the U.C.C. is
essentially the same. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 (1979). Note that the law of many states, e.g., New York, implies a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts. See, e.g., Rowe v. Great Atd. &
Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978). Nevertheless, the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is breached only when one party to a contract seeks to prevent its
performance by, or withhold its benefits from, the other. See Collard v. Incorporated Village,
427 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (App. Div. 1980). The mere exercise of one's contractual rights,
without more, cannot constitute such a breach. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman,
Inc., 128 N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y 1953); Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W2d 477,
482 (Tex. App. 1989) ("[I]n order to be actionable as a breach of contract ... bad faith
conduct must relate to some aspect of performance under the terms of the contract."); cf
Travelers Int'l A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 41 F3d 1570, 1576 (2d Cir. 1994) (invoking
implied duty "to measure compliance with an explicit contract obligation."); First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 509 (Okla. 1993) ("[W]ithout 'gross recklessness or
wanton negligence on behalf of a party' to a commercial contract, a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing merely results in a breach of contract."). Recently,
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It is possible, for instance, that an issuer made representations to an in-
denture trustee as to the propriety of a redemption, or it "arranged" facts
in ways that were neither honest in fact nor reasonable.
The problem with "good faith" arguments is that they are usually sub-
stitutes for analysis of contract language and will not be upheld, particu-
larly by appellate courts, unless it appears that the defendant abused a
contractual right in order to do harm to the plaintiff. This concept has
more currency under the French Code Civile as "abuse of right" (abus de
droit)89 and, in some states, under the doctrine of prima facie tort.90 For
example, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,91 Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company (the Met) argued that the equitable principles of
good faith and fair dealing supplied an otherwise absent indenture restric-
tion (not a non-call exception) against issuance of debt. The problem arose
when RJR Nabisco Inc.'s (RJR Nabisco's) management decided to pro-
pose a leveraged buyout, with the usual concomitant debt burden. The
bond market savaged the RJR Nabisco bonds, and the Met, one of the
largest holders, was dismayed to learn that the indenture did not contain
a negative covenant against incurring that debt. The district court dis-
missed, holding that the indenture was clear and that the court would not
imply a fiduciary or equitable duty to augment the written "agreement.
'92
The subtext was that the Met, which had required such restrictions in
earlier private placements of RJR Nabisco debt, should have known bet-
ter.93 The inadequacy of the indenture as the exclusive source of contract
terms is unlikely to be remedied by recourse to a general notion of fairness.
Unless the claim gives rise to punitive damages under state law, however,
"good faith" would seem to add nothing to the contract claim except
perhaps to make admissible some prejudicial evidence relating to conspir-
acy to breach. While that approach might enhance the prospect of a sub-
stantial award from an inflamed jury, query whether it would not also
increase the likelihood of reversal on appeal for just that reason.
the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed a separate cause of action in tort for "breach" of
good faith. See Beshara v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 928 P2d 280, 291 (Okla. 1996).
89. See C. civ. art. 1382 (Fr.).
90. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of prima facie tort, see Schmitz v. Smentowski,
785 P2d 726, 733-39 (N.M. 1990).
91. 716 E Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
92. See id. at 1522. This Article will not revisit the oft-argued notion that implication of
a "fiduciary" duty from the issuer to the bondholder will protect bondholders. Suffice it to
say that courts are more enamored by the concept than commentators, many of whom
incisively point out its defects. See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 5, at 1254-55; Kahan, supra
note 5, at 612-13.
93. The district court buttressed its rationale with the notion that bondholders are entitled
only to repayment of principal and payment of interest as agreed. Metropolitan Life, 716 E
Supp. at 1518. This formulation ignores the bondholders' legitimate expectation of receiving
a rate of interest commensurate with the risk undertaken, which had just increased
dramatically.
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VIOLATION OF THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT
Bondholders may claim that the TIA provides a private right of action
to redress an improper redemption. Section 316(b) provides, inter alia, "the
right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the
principal of and interest on such indenture security ... shall not be im-
paired or affected without the consent of such holder."
'94
In 1990, Congress amended the TIA in an apparent attempt to create
a statutory private right of action. Unfortunately, Congress only did half
the job; it made clear that the TIA imposed duties on the parties to the
indenture, but it did not state that private parties could enforce those
duties. Apparently unmindful of the rest of the statute, Congress did not
amend section 12 of the 1933 Act to identify the type of action that could
be brought under section 316, and thus failed to identify the applicable
statute of limitations.
95
The TIA amendments are collectively referred to as the Trust Indenture
Reform Act of 1990 (TIRA),96 and one of them seems to establish federal
jurisdiction concurrent with existing state law jurisdiction to enforce the
indenture. 97 "The addition [of the phrase 'or duty' to TIA section 322
(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b)] clarifies the status of prescribed indenture pro-
visions as federal questions. Jurisdiction is concurrent in federal and state
courts to preserve a plaintiff's right to select a forum."
' 98
The Senate report accompanying Senate Bill 1712 (the 1989 bill99 pre-
ceding the final version) found that the bill's jurisdictional provision in-
cluded an implied private right of action. The report noted that "a mod-
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1994).
95. Limitations on § 12 suits are specified in § 13. See id. § 77m. Section 323 of the TIA
contains a private right of action for misstatements and omissions and specifies a statute of
limitations. See id. § 77www. It relates to omissions from a document filed with the SEC,
which would include the registration statement containing the prospectus. It thus provides
an analogue to § II of the 1933 Act, but does not clearly relate to § 316 of the TIA. See id.
§§ 77k, 77ppp.
96. See Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2713, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2713.
97. Section 322 (b) of the TIA provides:
Jurisdiction of offenses and violations under, and jurisdiction and venue of suits and
actions brought to enforce any liability or duty created by, this subchapter, or any rules
or regulations or orders prescribed under the authority thereof, shall be as provided in
section 22 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b). Section 22 of the 1933 Act provides federal jurisdiction of offenses
and violations, and concurrent federal and state jurisdiction of "suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter." Id. § 77v(a).
98. 135 CONG. REC. 6063, 6064 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. 4817, 4822 (1989); 134 CONG.
REc. 15,947, 15,952 (1988).
99. "H.R. 1396 originated in the House as the International Securities Enforcement Co-
operation Act of 1989." 136 CONG. REC. 26,828, 26,833 (1990). "The House passed H.R.
1396 in its original form on September 25, 1989. The Senate then adopted H.R. 1396 on
November 16, 1989, with a package of amendments. Those amendments included ... the
Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990 ...." Id.
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ification to section 322, the Act's jurisdictional provision, would codify the
holdings of Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 623 E2d 290
(3d Cir. 1980), and Morris v. Cantor, 390 E Supp 817 (S.D.N.Y 1975),
finding private rights of action for enforcement of mandatory indenture
terms."
100
Accordingly, the court in LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, National
Ass'n' 0 held that all "duties imposed by the statute ... may be enforced
by private parties." 0 2 The "anti-impairment" provision of section 316(b)
of the TIA is of the type subject to private action because it was originally
a mandatory indenture term and is now a duty at law. Thus, as with the
breach of contract theory discussed above, an issuer breaches its duty to
pay interest when it redeems bonds under a scenario not expressly au-
thorized in an indenture. In UPIC & Co. v. Knder-Care Learning Centers,
Inc.,' 0 3 the court held that a plaintiff's "right to bring an action to recover
principal and interest under [bonds] is guaranteed by operation of Section
316(b)."1
04
Although Congress did not see fit to identify a statute of limitations, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar issue under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),10 5 which entirely omitted
a statute of limitations, and adopted a four-year statute based on a review
of statutory causes deemed similar.106 Justice Scalia concurred, but said
there should be no statute of limitations on RICO actions because Con-
gress needs to address the problem and will be forced to do so if RICO
actions exist forever. 107 Despite the purity of Justice Scalia's logic, it would
seem that the majority of the Justices correctly "filled the gap" in the
legislation. Otherwise, it would seem hard to discern congressional in-
tent. 10 8 Based on that reasoning, section 323109 of the TIA should be held
to govern actions under sections 322110 to enforce rights under sections
305"'1 and 318.112
Assuming that Congress did intend a private right of action under sec-
tion 322, and that section 323 should provide the statute of limitations,
one again confronts the rationale of Lampf Pleva. In a nutshell, if section
100. See S. REP. No. 101-155, at 31 (1989).
101. 935 F Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
102. Id. at 1340.
103. 793 F Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y 1992)
104. Id. at 457.
105. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
106. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
107. See id. at 170.
108. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 129 (1989).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1994).
110. Id.§77vvv.
111. Id. § 77eee.
112. Id. § 77rrr.
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323 bars an action brought more than three years from the date of issu-
ance of the bonds, then a federal contract action under TIA section 322
is of little use, unless the issuer happens to call the bonds within three
years of issuance. There is also no policy reason why limitations should
be shorter for a federal contract action than the four or six years permitted
under most state statutes, particularly when the effect is to preclude an
action before the bondholder realizes that one exists. Lampf Pleva dealt
with tolling the statute because of non-discovery of the violation and de-
cided as a matter of policy that three years was an absolute bar.' 13 That
rationale does not apply to a redemption case, where there is no problem
with discovery of the violation; the issuer makes the violation clear by the
act of redemption of the bonds. Instead, courts should hold that the statute
does not begin to run until the date of purchase by the issuer, which is to
say the date of redemption. That would satisfy the policy reason behind
limitations: to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights and bringing
actions after memories have faded, witnesses have disappeared, and the
participants have otherwise proceeded with their lives. It is the redemption
that heightens everyone's sensitivities. The issuer knows or should know
that its actions will be challenged. Indeed, in Texas-New Mexico Power Co. v.
Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 114 upon notice of extreme unhappiness
from its major bondholders, the issuer promptly escrowed an amount
roughly equal to the interest differential between the then-market rate and
the coupon rate for the remaining life of the bonds. It was then up to the
bondholders to sue or not, and it would not be unreasonable to impose a
short, even a one-year, limitations period in such circumstances. Courts
could separately address issues of punitive damages, possibly indicated for
deliberate conduct, under non-contract theories.
A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL
CONTRACT REMEDY
All of the discussion of the TIA seems interesting, but redundant of a
state law contract claim. The only advantage to a TIA claim would seem
to be preservation of federal jurisdiction in the absence of diversity. There
may, however, be another part of the argument. Unless TIA section
322(b)' 15 merely provides a federal forum for breach of the indenture, it
should be more broadly read to provide a remedy for breach of a federal
contract, namely the offer contained in the prospectus as well as the in-
denture.
Among the "duties" imposed by TIRA, section 305(a)(2) 116 requires the
issuer to specify the terms of replacement and substitution of collateral.
113. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1990).
114. No. 4.95-CV-738-Y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b).
116. Id. § 77eee(a)(2).
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This provision seems to require a description of the terms on which a
special redemption, particularly at par, would be permitted in the event
that collateral were not to be replaced or substituted.11 7 Moreover,
amended section 318(a) provides that the duties imposed by sections 310
through 317 control contrary or omitted indenture provisions.1 18 If so,
then the TIA offers an independent legal basis for suit based on the pro-
spectus as part of the bond contract. Such a reading would require the
issuer to specify in the prospectus all of the instances in which it would be
entitled to redeem the bonds at par, thereby complying with section 305,
and supplying the omitted indenture provisions, as required by section 318.
Unless specified, the right would not exist. This construct would more
nearly meet the expectations of the parties. The bondholders could ac-
tually read the terms of their contract in the language of disclosure instead
of the often obscure language of the indenture. The issuer, forced to dis-
close all of the circumstances of redemption, could not later find a loop-
hole such as was upheld in Broad v. Rockwell1 19 and Prescott, Ball & Turben
v. CTV Corp. 120 In each of those cases, at least one court found that either
a literal omission 21 or a tortured reading 122 permitted the par call. If the
prospectus omission were a bar, however, none of those redemptions would
have been allowed.1
23
117. Section 305 of the TIA provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Information required .. a registration statement relating to a security shall include ...
(2) an analysis of any provisions of such indenture with respect to (A) the definition
of what shall constitute a default under such indenture ... (C) the release or the
release and substitution of any property subject to the lien of the indenture ....
Id.
118. Section 318 of the TIA provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Imposed duties to control
If any provision of the indenture to be qualified limits, qualifies, or conflicts with
the duties imposed by operation of subsection (c) of this section, the imposed duties
shall control.
(c) Provisions governing qualified indentures
The provisions of sections [310] to and including [317] of this title that impose
duties on any person ... are a part of and govern every qualified indenture, whether
or not physically contained therein ....
Id. § 77rrr(a), (c).
119. 642 E2d 929, 955-57 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. 531 F Supp. 213, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
121. See Broad, 642 E2d at 947 (stating that "a court must be concerned with what the
parties intended, but only to the extent that they evidenced what they intended by what they
wrote").
122. See Prescott, 531 E Supp. at 219 (interpreting a section of the TIA).
123. A similar outcome was reached in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F2d 1373 (2d Cir.
1975). In that case, the indenture provided for mailed notice of a redemption only to holders
who registered their convertible subordinated debentures; the bond itself and the prospectus
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Would this be a good outcome for the capital markets? Again, the con-
flict is between the issuer's desire to avoid paying an above-market rate of
interest versus the bondholders' desire to retain the promised return on
investment. First, one should disregard the anomalous results. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. 124 is such a case. Put simply, although
the Met had been careful to limit the issuer's ability to downgrade its credit
rating in earlier private placements, somebody missed the omission in the
public deal that went to litigation. The Met had no real expectation that
debt quality would be maintained because it did not insist on maintain-
ing debt quality at the time of purchase. That case was correctly decided,
despite some unfortunate dicta about the nature of the bargained
contract. 1
25
More difficult are the close cases like Harris v. Union Electric Co. 126 There
the indenture said that the issuer could not redeem the bonds by transfer-
ring funds from the Improvement Fund to the Maintenance Fund, which
described that which was expected to be the most customary type of trans-
action. It did not say that direct transfers from the Maintenance Fund
were a prohibited source of redemption funds. Most likely, nobody even
thought about it. Perhaps the issuer saw the loophole and reserved it for
future use. The bondholders' expectations were saved only because the
ultimate outcome was via jury verdict. None will know what the jury had
in mind, other than that the bondholders' legitimate expectations were
frustrated. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit believed that
justice had been done and refused to upset the verdict, even though there
were obvious logical holes, if not inconsistencies. 127 Absent a verdict, how-
ever, the result would have been impossible to sustain on traditional con-
tract analysis of the indenture alone. Unless the guiding legal theory is
going to be "get to the jury," that is an unsatisfactory result. A more
disciplined principle is required and would better serve the capital markets
by meeting the expectations of both the issuer and the investor. Simply
put, if the issuer wants to sell a non-callable bond, it should say so. The
market can then price the bond accordingly, granting it a lower interest
rate than a callable version. If there are to be non-call exceptions, they
failed to reveal the limited notice provision. The Second Circuit, assuming putative jurisdic-
tion under a stock exchange rule supposedly effectuating a 1934 Act provision, found a private
right of action and held that the notice was inadequate and would not be enforced. Id. at
1380, 1383. There was no evidence of fraudulent intent to conceal the indenture provision;
it simply was not repeated in the prospectus. As the Court tacitly acknowledged, liability was
better analyzed under contract law principles. Id. at 1385. It found that there was no meeting
of the minds because the bondholders never knew about the limited notice provision. Id. at
1383-84.
124. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 E Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
125. Id. at 1517.
126. 787 E2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986).
127. See id. at 372.
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can be stated. The market can guess at the likelihood that one of them
will come to pass and make price adjustments.
A technical issue is the life of the prospectus, which currently must be
delivered to purchasers who buy within ninety days of the effective date
of the registration statement. 128 The prospectus need not be delivered to,
and may not be relied upon by, a later buyer in the secondary market. 129
It is unclear whether a later buyer from the issuer could rely on the issuer's
statements in an outdated prospectus.
SEC rule-making would be required to provide that statements in the
prospectus relating to the issuer's ability to call the bonds, and perhaps
other contents, remain effective for the life of the bonds. They amount to
warranties, not merely disclosure points. Analytically, this characterization
fits within the notion of an expanded federal contract governing the bonds,
meets the expectations of the parties, and provides a logical underpinning
for the private right of action Congress seems to have provided in
TIRA. 130
LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD IN THE
REDEMPTION OF BONDS
A bondholder also may be able to allege that a redemption, as distin-
guished from an issuance, was fraudulent within the meaning of section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10-b(5) thereunder. 13 1 The theory in such
a case is that the redemption at issue violated section 10(b) under the
"forced seller doctrine," which is occasionally referred to as "transaction
fraud."13
2
There is a source of proof of a device or artifice unique to bond debt.
To redeem bonds (or to procure a release of trust estate property with
which to fund a redemption), an issuer typically must provide one or more
certifications to the indenture trustee. Moreover, in a case involving the
release of property that is cross-collateralized, certifications under more
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1994).
129. See id. § 771; see also Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hirsch, 810 E Supp. 1253, 1256
(S.D. Fla. 1992).
130. Although it might be argued that this scheme would place debt securities on a dif-
ferent plane than equity securities, this Article submits that the argument is true and the
differentiation proper. An equity security is an investment in the fortunes of the company,
not a contract for a stated amount to be repaid with interest. A contract's terms remain in
force for the "life" of the contract, even if that extends over a period of years and the
circumstances of the parties change. A stock purchase, on the other hand, is an investment
without certainty that either a return will be paid or that the original investment can be
recovered if the business fails. Different circumstances justify different regulatory approaches.
131. See 17 CER. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999). Rule lOb-5 makes it illegal to use deceptive devices
or to make misleading statements "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
132. See Harris II, 787 E2d 355, 366 (8th Cir. 1986); Alley v. Miramon, 614 E2d 1372,
1380 (5th Cir. 1980).
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than one indenture and to more than one trustee, or to a bank, are com-
mon. Thus, if a particular redemption is a stretch under a non-call ex-
ception, the issuer may stretch or omit facts in order to satisfy one or more
trustees' needs for appropriate certifications. 133 Depending on the facts
revealed, the claim could be pleaded as securities fraud.
In Texas-New Mexico Power Co. v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., for
example, the issuer had to certify to one indenture trustee that there were
no actions pending or threatened that would encumber any of the trust
estate. 134 Simultaneously, the issuer had to certify to the trustee of the
bonds to be redeemed that a portion of the trust estate was being con-
demned by a governmental entity. This anomaly presented serious credi-
bility problems for the issuer. Compounding the inherent contradiction
was the routine nature of such certificates: officers, including the president,
signed them without any personal knowledge of their truth. Although the
financial community might wink at such offhand averments, a jury might
be less inclined to do so.
Even in the absence of a jury, such evidence would tend to show a
conscious indifference to the truth, or recklessness, 135 that could lead to a
finding of scienter, if not common law fraudulent intent. It is the type of
evidence from which a fraud could be inferred.136 The problem, however,
is that the bondholders are unlikely to find out about it before their case
is dismissed. Under the Reform Act, it may be necessary to plead such
generally unavailable evidence rather than a more general set of facts from
which the motive to commit fraud can be inferred. 137 This anomaly shows
133. Of course, an issue of standing may arise in this type of case, given that the pertinent
misrepresentations would be made to the trustee, not the bondholders. But if the certifications
made to the trustee are inadequate, the trustee may have liability. See, e.g., Shawmut Bank v.
Kress Assocs., 33 E3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving bondholders who sued for
disbursements made by trustee on inadequate requisition certificates). A suit against a trustee
in this circumstance might prod the otherwise reluctant trustee to bring any misrepresentation
claims.
134. No. 4.95-CV-738-Y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5748, at *4-*5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997).
135. Recklessness probably qualifies as scienter in most circuits:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 E2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 E2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)).
136. See, e.g., Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 E3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. III 1997). Although the amount of a public company's
outstanding public debt will be reported in various financial publications, only a study of its
SEC filings will locate copies of the indentures under which the various bonds were issued.
If the indentures can be found, so can the language required in certificates to permit the
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that federal securities fraud cases are blunt and inherently unsatisfactory
weapons to address contract breaches and statutory violations absent ob-
vious evidence of malefaction.
Under the proposed federal contract, however, fraudulent misstatements
or omissions would be easier to discern and to punish. Either the pro-
spectus described the type of redemption event or it did not. There could
be room for legitimate disputes, of course, but the issuer would have the
heavy burden of showing that the prospectus language effectively warned
a reasonable investor of the possible redemption. Technical indenture lan-
guage would not impede such a showing. In fact, the practical necessity
of alleging fraudulent or knowing behavior would diminish if not be elim-
inated in all but egregious cases. Issuers could take some comfort in know-
ing that a wrong guess on the adequacy of a disclosure term could more
easily be dealt with as a matter of federal contract law rather than fraud
law with its attendant risks of punitive damages. A fraud case might, in
keeping with recent statutory amendments elsewhere, 138 require pleading
and proof of intentional wrongdoing, a difficult hurdle. That type of rule
would avoid the anomalous negative pregnant in Morgan Stanley & Co. v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co.139 In that case, the plaintiff argued that the de-
fendant "failed to reveal its ... view of the redemption language" in a
prospectus and thereby committed fraud.140 The court noted that "[iun
order for Morgan Stanley to prevail on this claim, it would have to show
that the interpretation of the provision urged by the defendant was con-
trary to that prevailing in the investment community when the Debentures
were issued."' 4' One must ask: why would a showing that the defendant
held a minority view of the meaning of a provision constitute fraud?
Where is the intentional conduct, the scienter, at least? Does that not
merely sound in breach of contract? Again, a federal contract including
the prospectus offers a more disciplined rationale for the rule.
INVESTORS AND ISSUERS NEED A COHERENT
THEORY OF DAMAGES FOR IMPROPER
REDEMPTIONS
The theory and calculation of damages in improper redemption cases
often present novel questions of law and fact. When bonds have been
redemption of other debt. At that point, however, it will be difficult to obtain copies of the
certificates, making it impossible to fairly allege their contents. Depending on the jurisdiction,
pleading on information and belief may be sufficient, but some counsel, particularly for larger
institutions, would be reluctant to bring suit on that basis.
138. See id.; Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
139. 570 F Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
140. Id. at 1537.
141. Id.
344 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 55, November 1999
redeemed, the primary injury is lost interest over the remaining term of
the bond, rather than loss or diminution in value of principal. Most se-
curities fraud cases have involved stocks, not bonds. The holdings and ratio
decidendi in those cases tend to focus on out-of-pocket loss, not a useful
concept in the interest-loss context. For example, the traditional measure
of recovery under Rule 1 Ob-5 is out-of-pocket loss. 142
In a case based on an unauthorized redemption, damages may appear
deceptively simple to quantify. In one approach, bondholders may be said
to have lost the difference between the interest that their redeemed bonds
were earning and that of an equivalent reinvestment. Proof of this loss
can be shown in one of two ways. First, if there is a market for the bonds
at the time of redemption, damages would be the difference between the
market price and the special redemption price. Second, and alternatively,
an expert may show that a comparable reinvestment is earning a certain
percent less than the redeemed bonds and can then project that differential
over the remaining life of the redeemed bonds.
143
If, however, the central claim is that call risk was neither agreed upon
nor adequately disclosed at issuance, causing the bonds to be mispriced,
then the expert's task will be to determine the higher coupon rate (or lower
price) assigned to the bonds so that they would have been marketable at
issuance. Appropriate proof may be developed through the use of com-
parables, price drops 144 and/or such financial models as Black-Scholes-
Merton. 14 5 As the court held in Union Electric,
142. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 E2d 534, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1981).
In this situation, a plaintiff can recover damages equal to the difference between the price
paid and the "real" value of the security, i.e., the fair market value absent the misrepresen-
tations, at the time of the initial purchase by the defrauded buyer. That formula, however,
does not exactly fit an interest rate loss.
143. The two methods should yield roughly the same results.
144. The Reform Act's amendment to § 21(e)(l) of the 1934 Act bars certain damage
claims for market loss when the price of a security "bounces back" after the dissemination
of a misstatement or omission:
[I]n any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff seeks to establish
damages by reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to the
plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or
received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading
price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is
disseminated to the market.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
145. Several studies have examined the question of how the presence of a call provision
affects the rate of interest set on a bond at issuance. See, e.g., THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED
INCOME SEcURrrES (Frank J. Fabozzi et al. eds., 1991) (reviewing various approaches);
RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (3d
ed. 1988) (opining that the Black-Scholes pricing model, which was developed to value op-
tions generally, could be used for call provisions); Kraus, supra note 1 (noting study from the
1970s determining that a call provision was worth 30 basis points and opining that current
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[t]he proper measure of damages in this case is the difference be-
tween the purchase price and the actual value of the bonds on the
date they were issued. This remedy is best suited to the harm in this
case because it represents the reduction in the value of the bonds
caused by the lack of call protection. Although the plaintiffs pur-
chased the bonds for less than 101, the bonds were worth much less
because the call protection that the plaintiffs thought they were pur-
chasing did not exist. The plaintiffs paid more for the bonds than
they were actually worth. This is not one of those cases recognized
by the court in Harris v. American Investment Co. in which the value of
the security should be determined on the date the fraud was discov-
ered because its true value on the date it was purchased is too difficult
to ascertain. To the contrary, we believe that the true value of the
bonds on the date they were issued is reflected by the drop in the
market price once the fraud was discovered. We agree with the plain-
tiffs that the reduction in market value fairly represents the reduction
in the initial purchase price of the bonds that would have been nec-
essary in order to sell them at 10'/2% without the call protection. The
plaintiffs introduced ample evidence demonstrating that if [Union Elec-
tric] had issued the bonds without the ten-year-call protection, the plain-
tiffs would have either paid a substantially lower price for the bonds or
demanded a higher coupon rate.
146
Although the theoretical choices may be so described, few courts have ac-
tually employed a Union Electric type of analysis under the securities laws. A
few cases under section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act 147 have attempted to approach
a market-rate calculation by awarding prejudgment interest at an above-mar-
ket level, a crude instrument at best. 148 One court noted that although punitive
damages were not allowed, the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest was
"that which will adequately compensate the plaintiffs for the loss of use of
their money." 149 The court then awarded the plaintiffs twelve percent interest,
pointing out that they could have obtained this much from an alternative
investment in their money market fund.150
increment would be several times higher because of the increase in interest rate volatility
since that time).
146. Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F2d 355, 367-68. Note the imbedded acceptance of
the efficient market theory.
147. Owing to statutory amendments in 1995, former § 12(2) was renumbered as (a)(2),
and a new subsection (a)(1) was added. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, § 105.
148. See Kaufman & EnzerJoint Venture v. Dedman, 680 E Supp. 805, 814 (W.D. La.
1987).
149. See Scheve v. Clark, 596 E Supp. 592, 596 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
150. Id.
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The federal courts have had to craft a damages rule for implied actions
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 151 and Rule IOb-5 thereunder.152 Because
Rule 1 Ob-5 contains no damages provision, the courts turned to section 28 of
the 1934 Act, which provided that the plaintiff could recover only "actual
damages on account of the act complained of.'1 53 This unclear phrase led
some courts to the belief that it meant an "out-of-pocket" rather than "ben-
efit-of-the-bargain" measure.
This issue arose in Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp., 154 where the
plaintiff complained in a derivative suit that the defendant caused the injured
company, which it controlled, to lend it money at a favorable rate. Eventually,
the defendant repaid the loan with the agreed upon, but below-market, in-
terest and claimed that the plaintiff, having no out-of-pocket loss, had suffered
no damages cognizable at law.
The facts were as follows: Zeller, a stockholder of Belco Pollution Control
Corp. (Belco), sued derivatively Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp. (Bogue),
certain of its directors and others. He alleged that Bogue caused Belco to offer
to the public 200,000 of its 810,000 common shares, that Belco suffered op-
erating losses thereafter and was short of working capital, but that the indi-
vidual director defendants caused Belco to lend to Bogue over $300,000 at
eight percent interest, a below-market rate for the risks undertaken. When
those loans were disclosed, a second Belco public offering was aborted. Suit
was based on Rule 10b-5 and state securities laws.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the complaint on the basis that section 28(a) of the 1934 Act entitled
plaintiff to recover only under the "federal" out-of-pocket damages rule. 155
The plaintiff appealed.
In a decision by Judge Henry Friendly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's panel noted plaintiff's arguments that Belco could have ob-
tained more than eight percent interest in an arm's-length transaction. 56 The
panel then observed that, although the "benefit of the bargain" rule had been
repudiated in 1934 Act cases in several circuits, "[s]uch repudiation does not
necessarily call for a rule that, if a fraudulent seller can be shown to have
made a windfall profit, principles of the law of restitution do not require that
he be made to disgorge it."1 57
In this light, Judge Friendly discussed the plaintiff's claim that the eight
percent interest rate was fraudulently imposed:
Plaintiff's first theory of damages ... is, in essence, that the 8% note and
the preceding open account debt were not worth what Belco paid for
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
152. 17 C.ER. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
154. 476 E2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973).
155. Id. at 798.
156. Id. at 801.
157. Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
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them. We cannot agree with the district court that damage to a subsidiary
from forcing it to loan money to a parent necessarily is fully compensated
by the parent's paying off the note, even with a fairly liberal rate of
interest, if the subsidiary was in a position to lend money at a higher
rate. If Bogue had had outstanding 8% debentures which were selling
say at 80, it would be hard to deny that Belco was damaged if Bogue
forced it to purchase at 100 such bonds, whether held in Bogue's treasury
or an additional issue, even though they were paid at maturity. 158
The Second Circuit therefore held that the grant of summary judgment was
improvident and that plaintiff should be allowed to try his claims.159
One can note initially thatJudge Friendly discussed the proper measure of
damages in rescissionary terms. He focused on restitution, which in equity is
the award upon a finding that rescission has occurred or should be ordered. 160
He also focused on returning the plaintiff to the status quo ante, much as the
1933 Act cases have done. Judge Friendly recognized that such a result was
not adequate compensation for the misappropriation of the bondholders'
money, and that the bondholders should receive the difference between the
contractual rate and the rate necessary to reflect the higher risk of premature
call. 161 That approach is truly rescissionary and restores to the plaintiff the
position he would have occupied but for the misrepresentation.
In Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman,162 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit followed Judge Friendly in deciding that a form of rescissionary dam-
ages was appropriate in a 10b-5 case despite the general rule. 163 The Madigan
Group, a joint venture of corporate and individual investors, sued selling
shareholders of Fidelity General Insurance Co. for false representations under
Rule 1 Ob-5 and for Illinois common law fraud. The plaintiffs sold stock to an
affiliate, prior to bringing suit, for the same amount they had paid. The district
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had suffered no
loss from their purchase and could not recover lost profits or consequential
damages. 164 The Seventh Circuit thought otherwise:
The federal rule has traditionally been that only "out of pocket" losses
are recoverable in a fraud action. A defendant "was bound to make good
the loss sustained, such as the moneys the plaintiff had paid out and
158. Id.
159. Id. at 803-04.
160. Id. at 801 n.10; see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 43, at 971-72.
161. Zeller, 476 F.2d at 801 n. 10. Note thatJudge Friendly spoke of the buyer being made
to buy at 100 bonds selling at 80. Because the price of the bond is inversely related to the
interest rate, he saw that his example was another way of looking at being forced to accept
8% when 10% or more was the arguably correct rate.
162. 498 F2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 239-40.
164. Id. at 235.
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interest, and any other outlay legitimately attributable to defendant's
fraudulent conduct; but this liability did not include the expected fruits
of an unrealized speculation."
We adhere to this rule. Plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract;
they complain of a misrepresentation. If defendants had told the truth,
plaintiffs would have no complaint. Neither would they have had a mil-
lion dollars in expected profits on a 1-3/4 million dollar investment. The
consequence of defendants' acting legally would have been that plaintiffs
would not have purchased, or would have purchased at a lower price.
Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for lost alternative uses of their
money, but defendants' fraud did not obligate them to create profits that
never existed and, under the alleged circumstances, never could have
existed.
Even lost alternative investments are not literally "out of pocket" ex-
penses, but that shorthand phrase should not obscure proper analysis.
... Had plaintiffs not purchased the Fidelity stock, or purchased at a
lower price, they would have put the unused money somewhere, even if
only in a savings account. Unlike the non-existent profits envisioned as
a result of defendants' misrepresentations, the chance to use their money
elsewhere was actually lost to plaintiffs. But we agree with Zeller, supra,
that if plaintiffs seek more than the market rate of interest, they must
prove with a 'good deal of certainty' that they would have made a par-
ticular alternative investment that would have produced a higher return
than market interest. 
165
Much of the confusion might be alleviated if the proposed federal contract
model were adopted. Contract damages precisely fit the harm to a bondholder
suffering an improper redemption. The customary measure is lost profits; in
this instance, lost profits are the differential between the bargained-for rate of
interest and the rate available from an alternative investment of like kind and
quality. The argument, presumably, would be: (i) what was the bargained-for
rate, and (ii) whether the differential is measured from the point of investment
or point of redemption.
Bearing in mind that the rate is set as a function of safety and term (or
duration, in institutional cases), the bondholder would argue that the contract
rate would not be the appropriate baseline. That is because the rate was set
based on a misunderstanding of the risks involved. The investor thought that
he was buying a bond having a certain rate for a certain term. He may have
made the purchase because he thought rates were likely to decline in the future
or because he needed to match the maturity of the bond against an obligation
to pay money at that time. If the term was to be shorter, he would have
demanded a higher rate (to compensate for the lost future opportunity to enjoy
165. Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).
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the face rate 16 6) or would have bought another bond of the desired maturity.
In this sense, then, the "bargained-for" rate may be different from the stated
rate, which may reflect the issuer's belief that it could call the bonds before
maturity.
If the investor's perspective controls, then the applicable point of measure-
ment is the date of issuance, not of redemption. If the "bargained-for" rate
is to be measured based on the term matching the investor's expectations, it
must begin at the point of investment. If it were measured at the point of
redemption, then the investor would not be compensated for overpaying for
the call-risk bond and accepting a lower rate of interest during the period
leading up to the redemption. Stated differently, the issuer will have been given
a free look at the market during the bond term leading up to the point of
redemption, whereas the investor will have been saddled with an overpriced
bond.
CONCLUSION
Existing paradigms of liability for wrongful par calls are inadequate.
The notion that the indenture is a contract between the investor and the
issuer is flawed by the investor's usual total ignorance of its terms and the
ease with which public investors can be misled by lacunae in the drafting.
At the other extreme, using fraud theories to attack contract breaches
creates pleading and proof problems that reveal the inappropriateness of
the approach. The amended TIA offers some help, but it, too, has areas
of uncertainty that allow widely divergent outcomes much like those in
prior litigation. A more predictable theory would better serve the capital
markets.
Amending applicable SEC rules to incorporate the prospectus in the
contract would allow for a clear extension of TIA section 305167 duties to
bind the issuer to its statements. After all, we are discussing the means by
which the issuer will be allowed to vitiate investor expectations by redeem-
ing the bonds. It is more than reasonable to require those means to be
precisely stated and to admit of no further exceptions. While some issuers
might resent the loss of "wriggle room," they will likely be rewarded for
candor by the lower interest rates that confident investors will be willing
to accept.
166. This type of speculation is contrary to the norm that, because risk increases with
term, rates increase with term. In times of perceived high interest, however, such as 1980 to
1981, some short-term rates exceed long-term rates because of the belief that rates will
decline in the future.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 777eee (1994).
